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PREFACE
This research report analyses the economic changes which
have occurred in the New Zealand egg industry, since the
partial deregulation of April 1, 1986.
This'paper is very timely given the forthcoming review
of the egg industry production control system. The terms of
reference for that review (listed in Appendix A) correspond
closely to the content of this research. This research also
provides one of the first empirical investigations into the
effects of the deregulation of New Zealand agricultural
industries. The implications of these findings for the
deregulation strategy are noted at the end of the report.
A key finding of the research is that the movement away
from industry-specific controls has not yet brought the
predicted gains in the welfare of final consumers. This
appears to have been due to the continuation of substantial
entry barriers into the egg producing industry in the form of
the entitlement (production control) system. An associated
factor has been the imprecise nature of the general economic
regulations, such as the Commerce Act 1986, which replaced the
industry-specific controls. '
The author, Mr J. K. Gibson, initially conducted this
research for the honours dissertation of a Bachelor of
Agricultural Science degree. The research was supervised by
Dr R.G. Lattimore, a Reader in the Agricultural Economics and
Marketing Department 'at Lincoln College.
Professor A.C. Zwart
DIRECTOR
(ix)

SUMMARY
This research measures the costs and benefits of the
1986 reform of the New Zealand egg industry. The main items
of this reform were the removal of price, marketing, import
and grading controls. Production control remained in a more
flexible form.
Pr~or to the reform there were annual wealth transfers
to producers from consumers, distributors and retailers (who
operated under regulated margins) of between $8 and $13
million. The social costs, when compared with an ideal free
market situation, were in the order of $6 to $9.5 million per
annum. Most of this cost was due to suboptimal size and
location of egg producers as a result of production control.
Deregulation caused a significant downward adjustment in
producer numbers. Licences to produce (entitlements) were
restored to positive values providing compensation for
producers leaving the industry. The selling price for hen
quotas in the period following deregulation suggested a quota
rent of between 14 and 35 cents per dozen eggs. This rent,
for participation in a licenced industry, was only possible
due to the presence of substantial barriers to entry by new
firms, viz, the entitlement scheme.
There was weak evidence that entitlement transferability
led to more opt imal product ion scale and locat ion. The
exploitation of market power by distributor groups may have
affected the regional movement of production by influencing
producer prices and output adjustments. Deregulation changed
the nature of price setting such that declines in the real
price of inputs were not carried through into retail egg
prices.
The 1986 reforms produced a small (between four and six
cents per dozen) reduction in the wealth transfer to producers
from final consumers and marketing institutions. Changing
marketing margins indicated that retailers gained some of this
wealth transfer by increasing the markup on eggs to a similar
level to that on other perishable goods. The average gain for
each producer did not change due to the reduction in producer
numbers. The social costs after the deregulation were similar
to thoBe which had existed previously although the degree of
excess supply was declining. This was offset by a greater
expectation of quota rent by entitlement holders.
(xi)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The deregulation of the New Zealand egg industry iri 1986
provides an opportunity to monitor the costs and benefit~ of a
reduction in the level of regulation of an industry. Whilst
there have been several studies of the potential efficiency
gains from deregulating egg industries 1 the New Zealand
experience allows comparison with the actual changes that
occur when regulations change. Thus this study is positive in
nature rather than normative. It must be noted that the
deregulation was not total. All commercial producers are
still subject to seasonally adjusted hen quotas which are
administered by the New Zealand Poultry Board. A review of
the partially deregulated industry is set for 1988.
The current research aims to measure the welfare changes
associated with the removal of price and marketing controls in
1986. Social costs under the controlled regime resulted from
oversupply, constrained domestic consumption due to price
discrimination and efficiency losses due to the production
licencing system. Imports of egg products and eggs for
consumption, were prohibited both for quarantine reasons, and
to maintain the price discrimination policy. The partially
deregulated environment has a more flexible form of production
control and is characterised by egg distributor competition
for regional markets. The extent of the social cost under
these conditions will determine whether the current
arrangements are to be transitory with a complete deregulation
in the future, or permanent.
The individuals with the largest potential for welfare
loss were producers so it is appropriate that this research
places particular emphasis on their po",sition. Changes in
consumer welfare are also analysed, given that the aim of the
deregulation was to lower costs to consumers which had become
burdensome under the controlled setting. The research has
been based upon partial equilibrium analysis because the egg
industry is small in comparison to the national economy.
Chapter 2 describes the structure of the industry
before the 1986 deregulation and reviews its regulatory
history. Chapter 3 briefly describes the. policy changes, and
ensuing industry structure. A theoretical model of the
deregulation is presented in Chapter 4. This model considers
1 See Veeman (1982) for Canada; Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (1983) for Australia; Alston (1986) for State of
Victoria.
1
2the motivations for reform, and provides predictions about the
effects on production location, market structure and social
costs.
Analysis of the empirical evidence is carried out in
Chapter 5. The short period which has elapsed since the
deregulation in April, 1986 dictates a reliance on static
analysis, due to data scarcity. This provides only a
, snapshot' view of the changes, and may well mask dynamic
processes, given that economic events 'unfold' over time.
Therefore care must be taken in drawing inferences about the
effects of deregulation, from the limited data base that is
currently available.
With that caveat in mind, Chapter 6 compares the results
of the empirical analysis with the predictions from the
theoretical model. This leads on to a discussion of policy
implications and the chapter concludes with some suggestions
as to the direction of future research.
CHAPTER 2
DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRY PRIOR TO DEREGULATION
2.1 Structure
At the time of deregulation there were approximately 440
commercial egg producers. The majority of these commercial
farms (90.3%) had less than 15,000 birds and were run as
family units (Industries Development Commission (I.D.C),
1985). All were subject to production control with quotas on
their hen numbers. Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the
industry, using figures presented by the Poultry Board to the
I.D. C. review in 1984, and shows that most commercial
production was sold to licenced marketing agents for grading,
packaging and distribution to retailers. These agents
operated in geographically defined marketing areas in the
major population centres where they had a guarenteed market as
regulations compelled retailers in these areas to purchase all
eggs from them. Outside these marketing areas agents operated
under licence to larger egg floors and some producers were
permitted to sell to retailers. Producers in all areas were
allowed to make gate sales.
Figure 1: Structure of the New Zealand Egg
Industry Prior to 1986
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4Households with less than 100 hens made up an
unregulated "backyard flock" which produced 20% of national
output by the estimate of the New Zealand Poultry Board
(1984). The large size and seasonal nature of the unregulated
sector, relative to the commercial, meant that leakage effects
had the potential to lower the efficacy of pOlicy actions.
Evidence of this was provided by the continuation of an egg
surplus under a variety of policy instruments designed to
reduce it. Even with this surplus, regional supply and demand
imbalances required eggs to be moved around the country. The
north and centre of the North Island consumed 53% of the
commercial production but held only 48% of the entitlements
(hen quotas), conve:r:;sely, the South Is land had a similar
degree of oversupply (IDC, 1985).
The Poultry Board estimated annual domestic
disappearance to be 78 million dozen. This was based on an
extrapolation of personal consumption of 290 eggs/person/year
which had been obtained from marketing surveys. This may be an
over-estimate given that the the annual Census of Agriculture,
which covers farms with 25 hens and above, found total sales
for 1985 to be only 57 million dozen whereas the comparable
number from Figure 1 is somewhere between 66 and 81 million
dozen. Aggregate demand was relatively constant from 1973
onwards, with annual fresh egg sales by licenced marketing
agents fluctuating between 44 and 46 million dozen.
Commercial production levels did nQt exhibit a long-term
trend, but were less stable, and surplus eggs were diverted
into secondary markets. Most of the surplus was processed at
a loss, into unpasteurised pulp for the local baking trade,
and pasteurised pulp and egg powder for export. Allowance for.
a certain amount of this loss was incorporated into the retail
price under an agreement with the Department of Trade and
Industry.
2.2 Price Determination
Farm prices were administratively set on the basis of
four-yearly surveys of the cost of productlon for poultry
farmers. The surveys measured the price of physical factors of
production, imputed wages for family labour and an allowance
for a return on capital invested. The producer price was a
weighted average of the production costs on various sized
farms, weights being based on the farm size distribution of
the commercial sector, and was updated at irregular intervals
in the inter-survey period. These prices were equalised across
the country and within size-based grades for all eggs,
regardless of demand.
Wholesale and retail prices were derived from the farm
level price, with margins set by regulation. The retail
margins, with an approximate 10% markup, were much less than
those found on other perishable items. Staple vegetables with
a reasonably continuous supply, such as potatoes, had margins
of 20% and seasonal green vegetables and fruit had markups
of at least 30% (Daldoff, 1987).
5In real terms the retail price of eggs fell steadily
under this controlled environment. This is shown by Figure 2
which presents retail egg prices deflated by the food price
index2 .
2.3 Production Control
In the 1960's the egg industry moved from a position of
shortage to one of over-production, this being due to the
guarenteed returns to producers stimulating investment in
productive facilities and increasing per bird productivity.
From 1966 to 1969 the Poultry Board ran a voluntary contract
scheme to limit this surplus production but it was
circumvented by the setting up of new units under seperate
ownership. This led to the Egg Marketing Regulations, 1970
which set up a Production Entitlement Schemewhereby every
owner of a flock over 1000 birds was required to hold an
entitlement licence, these being distributed gratis on the
basis of the number of birds then held.
2.3.1 Entitlement Levels
From the time of the entitlement scheme inception the
Board found it necessary to use various mechanisms to reduce
the total number of operative entitlements that producers
could hold. This was due to greater per bird productivity
resulting from improved managerrent and disease control to
fTlaximise the production from the restricted factor, viz hens.
Additionally, levies on entitlements forced producers to
increase the ratio of hens farmed to entitlements held, from
77% in 1972 to 96% by 1978. There were several mandatory
entitlement reductions and in 1977 the "Voluntary Incentive
scheme" (V. I. S.) was introduced with producers agreeing to
~educe their flock sizes by a set amount in return for being
levied at a lower rate. In 1977 the entitlement scheme was
extended to flocks of between 101 and 1000 birds so the Board
could exert greater control over production. In 1982 the
V. I. S. was "fine tuned" by having a greater production cut
during the spring and summer months when the backyard flock
came into lay. The effects of these policies on entitlement
numbers are indicated in Table 1.
This table also shows the impact on a 10,000 entitlement
parcel (initially representing an equal number of birds) which
differs from the reduction in total entitlements due to the
purchase and cancellation of approximately quarter of a
million licences by the Board, on top of the across-the-board
cuts. The V. I. S. scheme further reduced the operative
entitlements (number of hens allowed to be farmed) by 12%
during the seven spring and summer months and by 6% during the
remaining five months. The levy structure meant that the
V.I.S. was almost universally subscribed to. All of the above
2 This deflator is theoretically incorrect, due to the fact
that egg prices are a component, however they only
contribute 2.1% so the error should not be significant.
PRICE
cents/doz 260
(1983)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19811982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
,
<> Controlled Price c Free Price
7production cuts were applied to egg-deficit as well as egg-
surplus areas. The Poultry Board explained this as the
collective desire of producers to maintain a share of the New
Zealand market, equivalent to that which they had at the onset
of the entitlement scheme.
Table 1: Changes in Entitlement Levels 1970- 1987
Total
Entitlementsa
% of
Original
Effect on
parcel of 10,000b
1/1/71
1/2/75
1/4/76
1/8/77
1/6/83
31/3/86
4.805 million 100%
4.024 million 84%
4.142 million 86%
3.840 million 80%
3.240 million 67%
3.006 million 63%
10000
8500
8750
8000
7200
6696
a Adjusted
b Assuming
buying.
to include 101-1000 bird units prior to 1977
the owner did not increase entitlement by off-fa~m
2.3.2 Entitlement Transferability
When the scheme was first introduced there was free
private trading in entitlements subject to a maximum holding
of 20,000 licences (except for producers who had a greater
number at the start of the scheme). Equalised pricing meant
that producers at locations distant from the market were
having their transport costs subsidised by producers closer to
the market, and by consumers. Given that other costs were not
equal, the remote producer was often" in an advantageous
position and could afford to pay more for entitlements. This
distorted pricing led to the Board introducing 'controlled
transferability' in 1973, prohibiting entitlement transfers
from shortage to surplus production areas.
In 1976 the Board became concerned that entitlements
were bBing traded at over $4 per bird licence, NZPB (1976) and
in an attempt to dampen excess demand, introduced a moratorium
on transfers for two separate periods. The cause of the excess
demand for entitlements, an above equilibrium egg price
leading to supernormal profit, was not affected by this
moratorium and the entitlement purchase price continued to
rise (NZPB, 1977). The Board became sole buyer of
entitlements sold seperate from farm assets (' off-farm'
transfers) on August 1, 1978 after asking the government to
regulate in this direction. The delay between the
announcement and implementation of the policy change saw
producers buying entitlements at an increased rate, to get
8themselves to a desired bird holding, which exacerbated the
excess demand. Table 2 shows that in the month previous to
the implementation of these regulations, approximately 44,000
licences were traded. Over the next two years the Board paid a
price of up to $5 per licence and only 65,022 licences were
purchased and revoked. This provides some indication that the
Board buying price was less attractive than the market prices
in the prior period of excess demand.
Table 2: Transfer Data for Entitlements Sold 'Off-
Farm'
Year Price
Number of
licences traded
- 30/6/72 Negotiable
- 30/6/73 Negotiable
- 30/6/74 Negotiable
- 30/6/75 Negotiable
- 30/6/76 Negotiable
- 30/6/77 Negotiable/Moratorium imposed
- 30/6/78 Negotiable/Moratorium imposed
1/7/78 - 31/7/78 Negotiable
1/8/78 - 31/7/80 Board sole buyer @$5 maximuma
1/8/80 - 31/7/81 Board sole buyer @$5 eacha
1/8/81 - 31/7/82 Board sole buyer @$2.50 eacha
1/8/82 - 31/3/86 Board sole buyer @Nil valuea
1/4/86 - 30/6/86 Negotiable
- 30/6/87 Negotiable
a Set by regulation
b Provisional
264,707
376,749
326,802
215,406
220,583
251,998
203,202
43,696
65,022
219,668
4,102
Nil
291,882
156,000b
The sole buyer status of the Board was continued under
the 1980 Regulations with the purchase price being set at
$5 per licence until July 31, 1981; then $2.50 for the next
12 months, after which licences were to have nil value. It
was still possible under the non-transferability of licences
for producers to expand by buying a going concern and after
two years they could amalgamate their entitlement holdings.
By preventing the off-farm transfer of entitlements,
production was maintained in areas which did not correspond
to market location. In contrast the period of transferability
from 1972 to 1978 had brought about a significant relocation
of the national flock with 5% of all licences (and hens)
moving from the South Island to North Island resulting in more
balanced regional supplies and demands.
2.4
9
Changes in Producer Numbers
Production in the commercial sector has become
increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer producers.
The average annual rate of decline in producer numbers was 7%
over the period 1972 to 1986. Figure 3 which graphs the
number of entitlement holders from 1977 onwards (when flocks
of over 100 birds were included in the scheme) shows two
significant deviations from this downward trend. These were
1979 to 1981 when the Board was sole buyer of entitle-ments
and the price was to be reduced to $2.50 per licence after
that period; and from 1982 to 1985 when the price for
entitlements sold off farm was administratively set at zero.
The rate of decline in entitlement holders was zero during the
period of the "nil-value policy for entitlements sales. The
number of active producers may have declined during this
period as some entitlement holdings were not being used.
Producers recognised that this low rate of exit contributed to
excess capacity, necessitating larger production cuts for all,
and lobbied government for a return to entitlement
transferability (NZPB, 1984).
Changes in Entitlement Holder Numbers (1977-1987)
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CHAPTER 3
THE 1986 DEREGULATION
3.1 Description
On April 1, 1986 the following policy changes were made:
1. All controls over the marketing and pricing of eggs were
abolished.
2. Regulations dealing with grade definitions were
rescinded (although eggs were still subject to minimum
quality standards under Section 131 of the 1984 Food
Regulations) .
3. Import controls on egg products were revoked but
quarantine controls remained on imports of fresh eggs
for consumption.
4. Production control remained but the maximum entitlement
holding limit (previous ly 20,000) was abolished and
entitlements became freely transferable.
Figure 4 provides a schematic view of the resulting
industry structure, with quantities (where known) for the year
to June, 1987. Relative to Figure 1 there was still a
dualistic production sector, comprising the entitlement flock
on commercial farms and the unregulated backyard flock.
However the abolition of marketing areas meant that producers
were free to sell via any outlet. These new marketing options
caused a significant decline in the number of eggs handled by
previously licenced marketing agents, as independent
distributors (who were usually producers) became established.
11
Figure 4 : Structure
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3.2 Background
The egg industry deregulation was set within a context
of an increasing liberalisation of the New Zealand economy
that aimed to improve the overall efficiency of resource
allocation. The major items of this program were industry
studies that started in 1979, and included tobacco, milk,
fruit and eggs; as well as deregulation of the meat, transport
and wheat industries and a general freeing up of trade
restrictions and currency controls. The recommendations of
the 1984 I.D.C review of the industry formed the basis of the
1986 deregulation. The major difference being that the I.D.C.
had recommended that the entitlement scheme be abolished after
a transition period, whereas the government announced only
that it would be reviewed.
Further impetus for the deregulation came from the
Treasury who suggested that the controls then in place "led to
a very inefficient industry structure and use of resources"3
Public statements by the Ministers of Trade and Industry, and,
Agriculture and Fisheries indicated that the motivation for
the reform was to acheive lower prices for consumers 4 This
was a common motive in all of the deregulations, and involved
reducing producer control over the marketing process so that
the power distribution between producers and buyers was not
artifically distorted.
3 The Treasury (1984) Economic Management: Land Use Issues
p. 86.
4 Press Statement, 10 October, 1985.
CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE POLICY CHANGE
4.1 MQtivatiQn FQr RefQrm
It has been suggested that gQvernment regulatiQn Qf
eCQnQmic activity gives rise tQ variQus fQrms Qf rent
(Buchanan, 1980). These rents are abQve QppQrtunity cost
payments to resQurces, due tQ artificial restrictiQn of supply
resulting frQm administratively set standards gQverning price,
quantity Qr quality (BensQn, 1984). TraditiQnally an increase
in the surplus accruing tQ prQducers as a result of monopoly
actiQns has been viewed as a welfare transfer frQm consumers
tQ prQducers. The sQcial CQst in this case is the deadweight
lQSS triangleS caused by under-cQnsumption. Recently, a 'rent-
seeking' prQpQsition has been put fQrward in which prQducers
are assumed tQ cQmpete fQr these artifically created
transfers. The QppQrtunity CQst Qf reSQurces expended in
cQmpetitiQn fQr these rents is alsQ seen to be a sQcial cost
(PQsner, 1975).
These rents can Qnly be maintained if there are barriers
tQ free entry by pQtential firms,. In a cQmpetitive industry
subject tQ prQductiQn cQntrQl, secQnd generatiQn participants
dQ nQt enter fQr free because they have' tQ pay SQme licence
fee tQ gain a share Qf the rent stream. As a result, there are
Qnly transitiQnal gains tQ be made when gQvernment establishes
special privileges fQr a grQUp Qf peQple (TullQck, 1980).
Addi tiQnally, a view has emerged that the granting of
assistance Qr special privileges tQ Qneactivity Qr grQup can
Qnly be achieved by penalising Qthers (Treasury, 1984a). If
transactiQns CQsts are nQt tQQ high the disadvantaged g~oup
will lQbby tQ alter the distributiQn Qf gains in their favQur.
This may lead tQ. the "marginal adjustment trap" (Jones and
ThQmpsQn, 1984), where mQre regulatiQn is needed to overCQme
the distQrtiQns which arQse frQm the original intervention.
Given this situatiQn, gQvernments have perceived a
cQmprehensive reductiQD Qf interventiQn tQ be desirable.
HQwever the great divergence between the general
desirability Qf deregulatiQn and the actual prQgress towards
this gQal, indicates that it is nQt a smQQth prQcess. It is
suggested that in cases where gQvernment has nQ direct
financial invQlvement in an industry, and there will Qnly be
diffused gains, but CQncentrated lQsses frQm a refQrm of
eCQnQmic regulatiQn, effQrts tQ prQmQte refQrm will normally
S See Harberger (1954) fQr a discussiQn Qf welfare lQSS
resulting frQm reSQurce misallQcation due tQ mQnQpQly.
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fail (Lee and Orr, 1980). Failure of reform in such
situations is due to the fact that the potential losers have a
much greater incentive to organise and lobby government than
do the potential gainers. This view of government holds that
economic intervention and reform is a function of interest
group pressure.
The egg industry fulfilled all of these requirements;
wi th direct government involvement ending in 1976 when
consumer subsidies were abolished, a small number of gainers
from the regulated environment in the form of producers and
distributors and a large number of individual consumers each
making a small loss. The fact that reform did proceed in such
circumstances is contrary to the interest group theory of
government. However some recognition must be made of the
reviewing agency itself as a stimulus for reform. It appears
that the egg industry was subjected to an I. D. C. review,
rather than undergo self-reform as agreed to by the
Undersecretary to the Minister of Agriculture in December
1983, partly because the I.D.C. was running out of
'candidates' in it's industry restructuring program.
The egg industry deregulation was a part of a general
policy of economic liberalisation which began in 1979 with
'industry plans' for several agricultural and manufacturing
sectors. The stimulus for this restructuring of the economy
came from the poor growth rate experienced by New Zealand
relative to other developed countries; a high inflation rate
and a chronic balance of payments deficit. The industries
subjected to review, and the sequencing of reviews, were not
necessarily related to the degree of resource misallocation.
Other influences were the strategic importance of the industry
and the employment effects of restructuring. Additionally, a
reduction in the political strenth of farm lobbies meant that
maintenance of farm incomes was a less important pOlicy goal
than improved economic efficiency.
The scope of reform may also be limited bytransit~onal
costs, which are greatest in the cases where .deregulation is
potentially most beneficial, because structural adjustment
costs are proportionate to the divergence from competitive
optimum. The general economic restructuring which took
place in New Zealand should have acted to lower the
transition costs of industry reform. The flow-on effects of
decontrol were expected to lower the costs of subsequent
industry restructuring, and the widespread incidence of
economic pain might have made it easier for government to
resist specific lobbying pressures by pointing to the
disadvantaged positions of other sectors in the economy.
4.2 Entitlement Values and Movements
The purchase price for a quota in a competitive market
is it's marginal value, which is the difference between the
marginal revenue and marginal cost of production at the point
where the quota is binding (Butcher and Heady, 1963). If the
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quota has a life of more than one year (as entitlements did)
then the purchase price should be the discounted sum of
expected future benefits. The producer'sdiscount rate, time
planning horizon and the expected salvage value of quota
reflect individual expectations about the maintenance of the
supply restricting program in the future.
The general situation faced by an individual firm
constrained by a quota (on either inputs or output) is shown
by Figure 5. The marginal benefit of additional licences at
the point where quota is binding, is the distance AB, the
difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost. The
optimal situation for the firm is point E, the profit
maximisation point, at output level Qe. The firm's demand
curve for quota can be derived as the distance between
marginal cost and marginal revenue as output increases to
point E. The quota purchase price for someone wanting to buy
an existing unit is area PADC, as this is the value of the
rent associated with output OQq (Barrichello, 1982). Those
firms faced with higher marginal revenues and/or lower
marginal costs, will have a higher demand for quota over all
values. Even if two firms are faced with the same MR and MC
curves, the firm with the lower discount rate and/or longer
time horizon would be willing to pay more for quota.
The supply curve for quota is the difference between MR
and MC to the left of Qq, as it would be rational to sell
currently held quota if the offer price was higher than the
marginal benefit of those quota units (Arcus, 1978). A
situation of potential trade in quota is shown in part B of
Figure 5. The firm with the higher demand for quota has
demand schedule D', and at prices above Px firm D sells quota
to firm D'. In a perfect market quotas would be traded until
the marginal benefit of holding licences was equal for all
holders, with production concentrated in the hands of
producers, who by virtue of their efficiency and location, had
the lowest costs (Beck, et al., 1984). The costs of quota
purchase represent the neces sary 'br ipe ' for inefficient
and/or poorly located producers to leave the industry, and are
borne by the remaining producers, who are still made better
off by trade, with the producers surplus being shared amongst
fewer of them (Lane and MacGregor, 1979).
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Figure 5: The Derived Demand For Quota
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It is believed that producer co-operatives formed to
raise prices in competitive industries will exhibit unstable
tendencies, (Lipsey, 1983). It will always be in the interest
of any single member firm to raise it's output but if many
firms do so the co-operative will collapse and all firms will
lose. The punitive levies against non co-operators in the
entitlement and V.I.S. schemes, both before and after the 1986
deregulation, ensured the survival of the compulsory cartel
for all commercial egg producers. Piggott (1981) has shown
that for commodities with low demand elasticities, where non
co-operators were of equal, or larger size than co-operators,
the greatest gains from voluntary supply restriction accrued
to non co-operators. Tpeory would suggest that the 1986
marketing control removal would prevent pricing above the
level dictated by the overall supply restriction within the
entitlement scheme. Attempts at regional price discrimination
and/or supply limitation would break down in the long run due
to the presence of non co-operators.
4.4 Social Costs
Analysis of social costs in this study is based lipon
movement away from the competitive equilibrium as a result of
market distortions. It is assumed that the area under the
demand curve and above the equilibrium price is a measure of
consumer surplus (Beck, 1974). 'The supply curve represents
the opportunity costs of variable resources used in
production of a commodity, so any area above the supply curve
and below the price is considered producers surplus (Wallace,
1962) . The social costs of above equilibrium prices are
domestic consumption foregone and the excess of resource costs
over returns for any surplus production. Input quotas cause
social costs due to a structural shift in, as well as along
the supply function resulting in marginal revenue being
greater than marginal cost (Alston, 1981).
Wallace (1962) first established" that input controls
cause greater social costs of supply shift than output quotas,
due to an over-use of non-limited inputs in an attempt to
maintain production at pre-quota levels. This leads to a
situation of 'slippage' where a less than proportionate
reduction in output results from input restrictions. In
Western Australia the introduction of hen quotas in 1971 led
to a 9.5% per bird productivity increase as a result of this
more intensive use of other factors (Beck, 1974). The other
social costs of input quotas are due to their imperfect
allocation and non-costless transfer, as well as the fact that
producers desire a return on quota they hold.
Positive quota values involve a transfer of wealth from
consumers to producers (Johnson, Spriggs and Van Kooten,
1982) . The economic rent associated with quota ownership
should not all be attributed to the social cost of supply
restriction as it includes some quasi-rents, to factors such
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as land, which would exist without production control (Veeman,
1982) . It was found by Alston (1986) that the consumer
transfer to producers, as a result of production control in
the Victorian egg industry was between 12 and 21 cents (NZ,
1987) per dozen. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE,
1983) found a 'most likely' estimate of the consumer transfer
to be 41.5 cents per dozen for a study of the Australian
industry, although it appears that a mis-specification of the
supply function was involved, which biased estimates upwards
(Alston, 1986). In Canada, Veeman (1982) found a range of
values for the consumer cost of supply control from 6 to 24
cents/dozen.
The 1986 deregulation of the New Zealand egg industry
should have reduced social costs by reducing overproduction to
the level necesary to just cover wastage (which would also
occur in a free market) and lowering the efficiency losses of
production control. This can be seen by comparing Figure 6,
which presen-ts a geometric model of the egg market prior to
April 1986; with Figure 7 which presents a post-deregulation
model. In Figure 6, Df represents the farm level demand for
eggs within marketing areas. Pn is the gross producer payout
price, and Ps is the average return on the secondary egg
markets (dried and pulped eggs and shell egg exports),
including the sales to the domestic baking trade made at a
loss prior to July 1, 1984. Qd is the quantity of fresh eggs
demanded within the marketing areas at the administered price
(the farm price plus set margins for wholesalers and
retailers) . Qn is the total production within the fully
controlled sector, i. e. commercial production that went to
licenced marketing agents.
The guarenteed price to producers Pn was above the
marginal price Ps, leading to overproduction of quantity Qn-
Qd. The entitlement scheme was instituted to limit the size
of this surplus and had the effect of shifting the supply
curve from Sl to S2. Debate exists in the literature as to
whether quotas shift a supply curve to the left due to
inefficient allocation (Alston, 1981; Veeman, 1982) or to the
right due to a reduction in uncertainty for producers
(Johnson, Spriggs and Van Kooten, 1982). In the case of the
egg industry there is reason to suspect a leftward shift due
to three factors. Firstly, the limitation on individual
entitlement holdings prevented the capture of economies of
size which may exist for holdings as large as 250,000 hens
(Alston, 1981). Secondly the restrictions on transferability
resulted in non-optimal production locations. Finally,
entitlements had a positive value, the so-called "goodwill"
which was capitalised into average (and marginal) costs,
shifting the supply function upwards. It is assumed that the
movement from Sl to S2 is a pivotal shift because the effects
of suboptimal location and size limitations would have a
larger absolute effect at higher outputs, causing 82 to move
further from the free supply schedule.
Figure 6:
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For the period prior to deregulation the changes from
the self sufficiency point Pe, Qe were as follows: producer
surplus was increased by area OdPn - OfPe; consumer surplus
was reduced by area Pn efPe; and the social cost was the sum
of two areas; cost due to the supply shift, area Ogd; and
the cost of oversupply Qd hgQn - (( Qn-Qd) *Ps). The second
area measures the social opportunity cost of resources used to
produce the surplus eggs so it is appropriate to use the free
supply curve Sl rather than S2 which is the supply curve
including rent (payment above opportunity cost) intrinsic to
egg production.
In Figure 7, there is no social cost due to oversupply
as it is assumed that the removal of administered pricing and
marketing controls eliminates excess supply. This being due
to the presence of non co-operators forcing the farm price,
Pd down to the level which results from the intersection of
farm level demand, Df and the controlled supply, S2. This is
somewhat of an over-simplification as some surplus would be
necessary, to cover inter-temporal and inter-regional demand
variations, given that the possibility of storage does not
exist. Social costs in such a situation are Ode, being due
to the shift in supply which would result from the
continuation of the entitlement scheme.
In both Figure 6 and Figure 7, the use of an input quota
is shown to cause an upwardly sloping curved supply schedule
from the point where the quota becomes binding. This
curvature depends on the marginal rate of factor substitution
between the limited, and non-limited inputs, and is absent in
cases where the rate of substitution is zero. In Figure 6 the
social cost of an output quota for quantity Qd would be area
Oaef. The difference between the social cost, and producers
and consumers surplus in the two ,models is taken to be that
which can be attributed to the effects of the 1986
deregulation.

CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Producer Adjustment
The years prior to the reform were characterised by an
excess egg producing capacity, meaning that many resources
were earning suboptimal returns. It was expected that a total
deregulation of the egg industry would cause rapid structural
adjustment (I.D.C., 1985). The partial nature of the 1986
deregulation, with the continuation of the entitlement scheme,
maintained substantial entry barriers which provided incumbent
producers with some insulation from competition. The
reaction of producers, in making decisions about whether to
leave the industry or to expand production, provides important
information about individual perceptions of the policy
changes. The review of the entitlement scheme set for 1988
created uncertainty which could be expected to affect the
degree to which individual producers committed themselves to
making adjustments in their enterprises.
5.1.1 Producer Numbers
The theoretical model sugg,ests that a return to free
entitlement trading would facilitate the movement of high cost
producers out of the industry. At the time of deregulation
there were 438 entitlement holders, this number had declined
to 333 after 12 months. This 24% decline is illustrated by
Figure 3 and can be compared with the average rate of decline
of 7% over the period 1972 to 1986. It would appear from this
analysis that the reintroduction of entitlement trading
speeded up the rate of industry adjustment. Hunter (1981)
concluded that the initial introduction of hen quotas in
Australia had a similar effect.
<,
The movement away from administratively set and
equalised prices may not have provided producers with more
information about market conditions due to the continuation of
production control. This is because the price of eggs,
relative to other goods, would not reflect true supply and
demand conditions but rather the impact of the entitlement
scheme. Decisions by firms about remaining in the egg
production sector, or changing to other activities could thus
be influenced. To test this proposition, a model was built to
explain the number of entitlement holders in anyone year. It
was hypothesised that the explanatory variables were the real
producer payout price and the real cost of inputs, giving the
two components of the "cost-price squeeze". For the period
1977 to 1987 the following equation was estimated with
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
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*** **
(1 )
***
F(2,8) = 50.42
R2 = 0.93
Durbin Watson
statistic = 2.10
-252.2 + 12.677 P - 0.164 RPPI
(1.28) (8.95) (2.55)
[2.81] [-1.27]
N
where
() = t statistic
[] = Elasticity
*** = Significant at 1% level
** = Significant at 5% level
N = number of entitlement holders
P = producer payout, deflated by the CPI (12/83 = 1000)
RPPI = feed component of the "all-farming" input price
index, also deflated by the CPI
This equation confirms the a priori expectation that the
number of egg producers was inversely related to the cost of
inputs and positively related to the farm level egg return.
The producer price had the largest effect as shown by its
higher absolute elasticity.
The explanatory variables and the equation as a whole
were all statistically significant and there was no evidence
of a violation of the OLS assumptions. A form of the Chow
test for differences between two sets of regression
coefficients was used to test if the deregulation produced a
structural break in the explanatory relationship. This test
was chosen because there were only two observations available
for the deregulated period. The sums of squared residuals
were computed for the periods 1977 to 1985 and 1977 to 1987 to
give the following test statistic:
(SSR1+2 - SSRd/N2
..... F (N2, Nl-k)
SSRl / (Nl -k)
where Nl was the number of observations in subperiod I (1977
to 1985), N2 the number of observations in period II and k
the number of coefficient estimates in the equation. SSR1+2
and SSRl are the sums of squared residuals, from the model
estimated over the entire period, and from the regression on
subperiod I, respectively. The computed value of F(2,6) = 2.0
did not exceed the critical value so it was concluded that
deregulation did not alter the relationship between
entitlement holder numbers and input and output prices.
The economic implication of this lack of a structural
break with deregulation, is that the removal of price and
marketing controls did not alter the influence of prices on
exit decisions. This may have been due to the continuation of
barriers to ent£y in the form of the cost of entitlement
purchase for new entrants. On the other hand factors such as
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producer age structure and expectations, opportunity costs of
productive resources and policy changes and uncertainty also
influence exit decisions by firms.
5.1. 2 Producers Time Horizons
Entitlement purchase decisions were functions of the
adjustment to the partially deregulated environment and
expectations about the future course of the deregulation. If
entitlement purchase prices were not recouped by the time of
their abolition the current holders would suffer considerable
windfall losses, although there would be some gain in reaching
a target hen number earlier than those who waited for the
potential abolition of the scheme before expanding.
Hen quota selling prices ranged from $6 to $15 per bird
licence during the first 12 months of deregulation, $8 to $12
during the next 6 months and $6 to $8 after that (Mitchell,
1987) . By farming birds below the leviable age, with a
production level of 265 eggs/hen housed, it is quite possible
to annually produce 21.5 dozen eggs per base entitlement (see
Appendix B). If there was an expectation of recotlping
entitlement purchase costs before the 1988 industry review the
above trading prices imply a quota rent (for production in a
licenced industry) of between 14 and 35 cents per dozen,
making no allowance for a discount rate (which would increase
the rent estimate). Alternatively, using the entitlement
values, and estimates of the marginal benefit of additional
quota, it was possible to estimate producers planning horizon.
This assumed the purchase price for entitlements was the
discounted sum of expected future benefits.
The marginal value of entitlements was estimated from a
representative budget for a 20,000 bird unit, constrained by
entitlement cuts to a base entitlement holding of 16740 (see
Appendix B). A movement to the full capacity point would be
desirable, lowering fixed costs per base entitlement from
$7.60 to $6.15. The variable costs per"entitlement were
constant, or possibly declining with improved labour
productivity as entitlement numbers increased, and hence
provide an estimate of the marginal cost of extra
entitlements. The output price for an individual producer was
assumed to be independent of quantity, so returns above
variable cost provided a good measure of the marginal benefit
of extra entitlements, up to the full capacity output.
For the first 12 months of deregulation the budget
showed returns above variable cost per entitlement to be $7.67
and in the second year $8.45 due to lower levies and a higher
producer payout. It was assumed that producers had an
expectation of zero salvage value for any purchased
entitlements due to the low volume of reselling of bought
entitlements, and the potential demise of the scheme in 1988.
Egg payouts are made on a fortnightly basis and levies
collected on a monthly basis so the correct discounting period
is monthly (Arcus, 1978). The discount rate should be in real
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terms to account for costs and revenues in different time
periods. Two rates were used: a low value of 0.5%/month (6.2%
annually) and a higher value of l%/month (12.7% annually) to
reflect uncertainty about the future of entitlementS. Three
entitlement purchase prices, all within the commonly quoted
range were used: $8, $11 and $14 per licence. The implicit
time horizons, for purchases on April 1 1986 and April 1 1987,
are listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Producers Time Horizon (months) at April
1, 1986 a.nd April 1, 1987
Date
Discount
Rate
-----Purchase Price-----
$8 $11 $14
1/4/86
1/4/87
0.005
0.01
0.005
0.01
13
14
12
13
18
19
17
18
24
26
22
23
Table 3 shows that the prices paid for entitlements were
based upon a payback period of 26 months or less. The
majori-ty of entitlement sales took place in the first two
months of deregulation which would give enough time for
purchased entitlementB to pay for the~selves before the 1988
review of the industry. The time horizons in Table 3 indicate
that producers adapted their planning horizon very rapidly to
the length of the partial deregulation period. If the
entitlement scheme was abolished in 1988 there would only be
a few windfall losers amongst entitlement purchasers.
5.1. 3 ELoducer Surve;t
Interviews were conducted with ten Canterbury producers
(21% of total) in August, 1987 to supplement the analysis of
farm leve 1 adjustment (see Table 4). The ~ producers held
approximately 35% of the regions birds, indicating a bias
towards larger farms. Four of the ten had purchased
entitlements, one planned on selling his entitlements, and
three were marketing outside of the co-operative (CCD) egg
floor.None or the non co-operating (independent) producers had
purchased entitlements. All producers showed a very consistent
age and most had been in the industry for 20 years and/or were
second generation producers. It was generally agreed that
this age structure was a reason for their remaining in the
industry, being too young to retire but too old to begin a new
occupation.
Table 4:
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Producer Interview Responses
Affirmative Answers
Co-op Suppliers Independents
Would you purchase entitlements now?
Expect entitlement scheme to be scrapped?
Support total deregulation
Contemplate becoming an independent
Why did you leave the Co-op?
CCD production cuts
Desire to establish market position before
Major Concerns
Lack of grading by independents
Christchurch market volatility
'Predatory' (sic) pricing by the Co-op
Downgrading problems with Co-op
Windfall losses if entitlements scrapped
Overproduction if entitlements scrapped
Uncertainty about 1988 review
2 0
3 3
0 3
2 nla
nla
2
full deregulation "3
5 0
2 3
0 3
2 2
4 0
6 0
3 3
The producer interviews confirmed the rapid adaptation
of planning horizons as only two producers were prepared to
risk buying entitlements with the 1988 review coming up, and
neither of them would pay more than $7/1icence. Just over half
of the producers interviewed expected the entitlement scheme
to be scrapped, with all three of the independents lobbying
actively for that goal. The major concerns of the co-
operative producers were the lack of grading by the
independents, feeling that they were free riding upon the
previous market reputation of graded eggs, and the potential
for overproduction if entitlements were scrapped. The major
concerns that the independent producers felt were market
volatilty due to retaliatory pricing by CCD on mixed grade
eggs in the Christchurch market. The major reason for leaving
the co-operative was a desire to establlsh a market position
before complete deregulation. This also indicated an
expectation that the entitlement scheme would be abolished.
5.2 Entitlement Movements
Three months after the deregulation, the Chairman -of the
Poultry Board reported disappointment that there had been
little movement of entitlements from surplus producing areas
to egg deficit areas (Briggs, 1987). The theoretical model
predicted that free transferability and non-intervention
pricing, to reflect true regional profit relativities, would
lead to entitlements moving towards cost-minimising locations.
The Board had previously commissioned a Lincoln College study
on the optimal location of egg production in New Zealand
(Beck, li al., 1984) which had been based on an objective
function of reducing aggregate production costs (including
inter-regional egg transfers). This objective function would
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be minimised in a competitive market if there were no
adjustment costs and full information.
Although it used 1983 data, the study still provided a·
useful standard for compari$on with the actual regional
changes. This comparison is provided in Figure 8, however, it
should be noted that the regional definitions do not always
correspond with egg floor supply areas. The most obvious
divergences petween the recommended movements and actual
changes were in Wellington, which was an egg-deficit area from
which entitlements moved out of, and Tauranga and
Christchurch, in both of which it was recommended substantial
output reductions be made. The only areas to gain major
increases in entitlements were Auckland and Whangerei with the
largest losses recorded in Oamaru, Nelson, Wellington,
Hastin9s and Gisborne.
A correlation analysis was carried out to test the
statistical relationship between the Lincoln College
recommendation and the actual movements after 12 and 18 months
of entitlement transferability (see Appendix C for data and
transformations). The resulting correlation coefficients were
0.316 and 0.339, respectively, with the 18 month correlation
being significantly different from zero at the 90% level (with
16 degrees of freedom). It was inferred from this that
entitlement transferability led to some relocation of
production, and this appeared to be converging towards the
optimal location, as recommended by Beck, d al.. There
remained, however, significant regional variations in
adjustment towards the recommended levels.
5.2.1 Explanatory Model
An economic model of entitlement transfers was
formulated to investigate divergences between the actual
changes and what had been recommended. It was hypothesised
that the inter-regional movement of entitlements was generated
by different regional demand curves. Within the egg industry,
the minimum point of the short run average cest curve occurs
at the level of full utilisation of existing sheds. At higher
outputs the average and marginal costs rise sharply. The
reductions in entitlements had meant that most producers were
operating at between 70% and 80% of full capacity. The value
of additional entitlements was greatest for large producers
who had lower average and marginal costs.
Variables explaining different marginal revenues and
marginal costs facing producers in each area were also
included. The following regressors were expected on a priori
theoretical grounds to have explanatory power:
N regional population growth rate (from Census 1981
to 31 March 1985);
dP retail price change between 3/86 and 4/87, relative
to the average change in all other regions;
Figure 8: Comparison of Regional Changes Recommended by Beck Report 1 With
Actual Changes as at September 1987
o Beck recommendation
1 Beck, A.C. and Rathbun, J.P. 1984.
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excess capacity on farms which held more than
10,000 entitlements on June 30, 1979 (when
transfers ended) as at June 30 1985 (which should
have been the same as at the onset of
deregulation); and
regional deviation from the mean cost of producing
1000 dozen eggs (as published in the Lincoln
College study of optimal location) .
Models with various specifications of the above
variables were tried with the main finding of this search
being that cost and price relativities were not significant
explanatory variables. The insignificance of cost may have
been due to the changes which occurred in the feed industry
after 1980 (the period from which the data came). The non-
significance of regional retail price relativities may have
been due to a mis-specification. The more correct, but
unavailable variable would be the farm gate price
relativities. The use of retail price data would only be
correct if changes in marketing margins were similar in all
areas. Given the strong a priori theoretical reasons for
including a price relativity variable, it's non-significance
suggests that the marketing margins did not change equally in
all regions.
The model with the best explanatory power, based on the
criteria of maximum adjusted R2, was:
** * ***
regional changes in entitlement hold~ngs after 18
months of free trading.
Y
Where
.Y
-12169 + 1458.3 N + 0.877 XS
(2.87) (1.68) (3.93) ***
F(2,15) = 11.3
R2 = 0.60
Durbin Watson
statistic = 1.43
(2)
and Nand XS are defined above.
Equation 2 shows that entitlements moved out of areas
where population growth and excess capacity in the large farms
was low, and into areas where these variables were high.
Although the explanatory power of the model was significantly
greater than zero, the large unexplained variation (40%)
implied that some important explanatory influences had not
been captured. Some regional variation in entitlement
movements appeared to be due to the protection given egg
farmers incomes by distributors. In Canterbury the co-
operative egg floor accumulated funds during the period of
controlled prices to act as a buffer for th~ shock of
deregulation. In Wellington the egg floor, owned by dairy
companies (the Farm Products group), took no such action and
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producers took payout drops of approximately 40 cents per
dozen at the onset of deregulation (Mears, 1987).
This may explain why Wellington had a net loss of
entitlements, and Canterbury a net gain when the optimal
location study suggested the opposite should occur. The Farm
Products group also controlled other egg floors (Gisborne,
Hastings, wanganui, Palmerston North and Nelson) and in all
areas except Wanganui, entitlements moved outwards. This may
have been due to the fact that dairy companies were not
interested in buffering egg farmer's incomes. The
significance of this is that the price signals
generating entitlement movements were not necessarily
based on comparative regional resource endowments and market
distance, so the result was not necessarily optimal.
5.2.2 Inter and Intra-regional Transfers
Almost two-thirds of the entitlement transactions in the
first 18 months of deregulation resulted in production staying
in the same area . Figure 9 presents monthly data from the
time of deregulation onwards which shows that off-farm
entitlement transfers within regions were always more common
that inter-regional transfers. It also shows the dramatic
falloff in sales which occurred as the 1988 review of the
industry loomed closer. This confirms the estimate of planning
horizons made above. The lack of inter-regional movement was
partly a function of the private negotiation method of
transfer. The presence of significant transact.ion costs,
specifically the lack of public information about the quantity
and market clearing prices of available entitlements,
discouraged all but the largest firms from purchasing outside
their immediate geographical area. The group buying and
selling strategies that some regions utilised were an attempt
to lower the transactions cost to individual firms.
The wide variability in entitlement prices (various
sources reported figures between $6 ~ and $15) that was
maintained through the first 18 months of deregulation, rather
than converging to an equilibrium level, may also have been
due to this lack of market information. These transaction
costs prevented the market from allocating entitlements in the
most optimal fashion. In similar situations overseas, market
clearing agencies have often been set up, although the
marketing boards invariably become embarrassed by the high
price that quotas sell for and suspend trading or attempt to
disguise quota values (Lane and MacGregor, 1979). Supply
restricting marketing boards are in a difficult position over
this matter. Consumers rightly view high quota values as
evidence of excess profits within the industry but it is
necessary to provide quota price information to lower the
inefficiency losses stemming from imperfect allocation.
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5.3 Market Conduct
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The theoretical model suggested that an egg surplus in
the presence of production control was due to the administered
price being above that which would have resulted from the
restriction in supply. If that was the case then the removal
of price and marketing controls would lower prices to the
point where restricted supply intersected with demand, i.e.
administered pricing would be replaced with cartel pricing.
Over-production would then be reduced to the minimum level of
acceptable wastage. In fact a significant, although
declining, amount of production continued to be disposed of on
the secondary market (sales to domestic baking trade, exports
of pulp and dried eggs). Table 5 shows this decline in the
surplus which represented the impact of regional production
cuts and the lagged effect of the March, 1986 entitlement cut.
Table 5: Egg Receipts, Sales and Surplus
Previously Licenced Distributorsa
of
Year to: Receipts Sales Surplus
(million dozen)
Surplus as %
of 5 yr average
31/3/87
30/6/87
30/9/87
44.81
43.74
42.83
39.91
39.45
38.96
4.87
4.29
3.84
85%
75%
67%
aBased on weekly averages from NZPB,subject to rounding error
The continuation of surplus production may have been due
to both a slow rate of adjustment by producers and, to the
market power of the established co-operative egg wholesalers,
enabling them to maintain above-equilibrium primary market
prices. There is some evidence that market sharing agreements
were negotiated by distributors. The Canterbury co-operative
egg floor maintained approximately 30% of the Wellington
market after deregulation by becoming the majority shareholder
in, and manager of, the Wellington egg floor. An agreement
was reached where the 10% of the Wellington market that Oamaru
producers had historically supplied, was serviced with
Canterbury eggs, and the Christchurch floor received a like
amount from Oamaru. (CCD, 1987).
5.3.1 Retail Prices
Relative regional price changes were used to test if
price discrimination was occuring. A ratio of regional retail
price changes, relative to the national average was formed
from the following formula:
[Pi* - Pi]/[PNZ* - PNZ]
where
pi nominal price in region i at time of deregulation;
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PNZ New Zealand average price at deregulation; and
* = price after thirteen months of deregulation
The larger the ratio, the greater the regional price
increase relative to the rest of the country. The highest
rates of price increase (excluding Greymouth) were recorded by
Tauranga and Christchurch (1.47 and 1.26 respectively). These
two centres are in areas of surplus egg production, and along
with Hastings, had enacted regional production cuts over and
above the V. I . S. scheme. For egg distributors in these
centres to sell eggs in other cities, where prices were lower,
price discrimination had to have been practised. This was the
case with the Christchurch floor supplying Timaru, Ashburton,
Greymouth, Blenheim, Kaikoura, Dunedin, Auckland and Oamaru
with up to 50,000 dozen eggs per week (Parker, 1987). This
indicates the market power of distributors in being able to
influence prices, which may have made some contribution to the
continuation of excess supply. The fact that many egg floors
were producer controlled suggests that the use of market power
was seen as an complement to farm level adjustment.
An analysis was carrried out on egg price determination
to see if the removal of price control changed the
relationship between input prices and egg prices. Two
explanatory variables were used; the "pig, poultry and other"
farming input index and the lag of the egg price index. The
time period choosen for analysis ~as January 1984 to
Septemeber 1987 which was dictated by the "pig. poultry and
other" farm input index only going back that far. This gave
27 observations prior to deregulation and 18 afterwards. Two
separate regression equations were estimated with ordinary
least squares.
Subperiod I (1/84 to 3/86)
* *** **
Subperiod II (4/86 to 9/87)
**
REPI -0.157 + 0.747 REPIt-1 +
(1.77) (6.20)
0.395 RPPI
(2.19)
R2 = 0,.94 ***
F (2, 24) 205
Durbin Watson
statistic ~ 1.28
*
(3)
Egg Price Index Deflated by CPI (Dec 1983 = 1000)
REPI = 0.777 + 0.315 REPIt-1 -
(2.61) (1.30)
where
REPI
0.170 RPPI
(2.00)
R2 = 0.52 ***
F (2, 15) 7 • 95.
Durbin Watson
statistic = 1.76
(4)
RPPI Pig, Poultry and Other farm input price index,
also deflated by CPI
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Equation 3 shows that when eggs were under price
control, a well balanced, statistically significant
relationship was present. The explanatory power of the same
equation was much less after the removal of price control,
suggesting that a structural break had occurred. To confirm
this a Chow test for differences between sets of regression
coefficients was carried out.
(SSR r - SSRun) / k
- F (k, T-2k)
SSRun / (T-2k)
SSR r are the sums of squared residuals from the model
estimated over the entire period with the restriction that the
coefficients in each subperiod be equal. SSRun are the sums
of squared residuals from seperate regressions on the pre and
post deregulation observations. T is the total number of
observations in both subperiods (45) and k is the number of
parameter estimates needed for the model (3). The null
hypothesis that the coefficients of the equations were equal
in each subperiod was tested against the alternative
hypothesis that they differed. Comparison of the computed F
stat istic [F (3,39) = 4.26 ] with the tabled value indicated
significant differences between the regression coefficients
for the two periods.
The economic significance is that deregulation brought a
dramatic change in the relationship between producer input
prices and retail egg prices. Under the cost of production
method of price fixing a positive relationship between the
two variables had existed as input price rises were passed on
into egg prices. The negative sign in the post-deregulation
period indicated that this relationship had turned around.
From August 1985 the real cost of inputs declined; reflecting
lower feed prices resulting from international conditions 6, an
increase in New Zealand coarse grain "Production, and the
deregulation of the wheat industry. Figure 2 shows that with
the exception of a brief decline in the months immediately
after deregulation, real egg prices were constant. The
benefits of lower input prices bought about in part by
fortuitous international circumstances, and in part by the New
Zealand deregulatory policy, were not passed on to egg buyers.
5.3.2 Supermarket Survey
A telephone survey of 27 Christchurch supermarket
managers, from the Supervalue, Countdown, New World and
Woolworths chains was carried out in August 1987. This survey
aimed to guage retail response to the removal of marketing and
price controls. These managers had seen three major sources of
6 World traded prices for coarse grains were US$18 to $23 per
tonne lower, on average, in 1986 than in 1985 (F.A.O. 1987).
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competition in the Christchurch market during the first 18
months of deregulation. In April and May 1986 eggs from the
lower North Island and Nelson were distributed through the
local dairy co-operative. The second source of competition
was from local independent suppliers, with one leaving the co-
operative at the onset of deregulation and another three
joining him later. These independent marketers estimated that
they held 20% of the Christchurch market, mostly in the mixed
grade segment. In Septemb~r 1987 a small quantity of Dunedin
sourced eggs were sold through one supermarket chain at prices
of $0. 99/dozen, as a retaliation against the Canterbury
independent producers who had moved surplus eggs into markets
held by the Dunedin floor. The responses to the supermarket
survey are given in Table 6. .
Table 6: Supermarket Manager Survey
Responses)
(Affirmative
Individual
Managers
(27)
Chains
(4)
Changed egg sourcing at least once? 21 78% 4
If 'yes' was it to: Dairy co-op 5 19% 1
Local supplier~ 14 52% 2
Dunedin supply 2 8% 1
Have you gone back to CCD? <totally) 11 41% 2
from: Dairy co-op 5 19% 1
Local suppliers 4 15% 1
Dunedin supply 2 8% 1
(concurrently with local independent supply) 10 37% 1
Why did your return? Lower CCD price 4 15% 1
Inadequate supply 7 26% 2
Are you selling mixed grade eggs? 22 81% 3
Proportion of sales 0 - 40% 3 11%
40 - 80% 13 48%
> 80% 6 22%
Have you exploited distributor
competition? 20 74%
Changed margin behaviour? 16 59%
Are consumers better off under
deregulation? 23 85%
Most managers reported being able to exploit the
competition between distributors, and had changed their egg
supplier at least once. In comparision with producers
there was a great deal of satisfaction with the
deregulation and a belief that consumers had benefitted. The
removal of price control led to just over half the managers
changing their margin on eggs. Most respondents felt that
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there was sufficient competition in the grocery trade to
prevent excess profits. Deregulation, changed the nature of
eggs from being a staple purchase with stable price to an item
that could be placed on 'special' and used as a 'loss-leader'
to attract consumers. However, this appeared to be the
reverse of the trend in other markets, such as Auckland,
partly because the consumer had no awareness of the retail
margin under deregulation (Mitchell, 1987). The sourcing
volatility was such that the co-operative was able to regain a
significant market share by providing price competition with
mixed grade eggs. Supermarket managers did not report any
adverse consumer reaction to mixed grade eggs, whether they
were directly from the farm, or via the egg floor.
5.3.3 Grading Issues
In contrast to the supermarket managers, the lack of
grading standards on independently produced eggs was a major
concern for the co-operative producers. At issue was the use
of candling to check for blood and meat spots, as it was felt
that consumer confidence would decline without this quality
control. The independents were seen as possibly imposing an
externality on all producers because consumers could not
differentiate between farm-sourced and floor-sourced eggs.
Most analysis of the welfare impact of quality standards
deals with the case where consumers can evaluate quality
before purchase (Bockstael, 1984). This is not possible with
eggs so a lottery is operating where consumer welfare changes
due to sorting and grading depend upon their attitude towards
risk. The fact that consumers were able to buyuncandled eggs
at the farm gate under marketing controls suggests that
candling was a marketing service compulsorily attached to
retail sales, resulting in a loss of welfare for consumers who
preferred cheaper eggs with more risk. Eggs appear to be an
"experience good" (Bowbrick, 1982) in that consumers
perceptions of quality are derived by previous consumption
experience. Thus attempts by co-operatives to differentiate
their eggs, by advertising them as having 'high marketing
services' are not likely to be successful given the lack of
brand identification and loyalty that the supermarket survey
indicated.
5.4 Analysis of Social Costs
A comparative statics approach was used to compare the
producer surplus, consumer surplus and social cost s for
representative years prior to and after the deregulation.
Consumers were defined as all participants in the marketing
chain beyond the farm gate, with the distribution of any
increase in consumer surplus due to deregulation being
estimated using marketing margins. The fact that there was
still significant excess supply in the deregulated industry in
1987 indicated that the use of the theoretical model embodied
in Figure 7 would be inappropriate. However the reduction in
the surplus, which Table 5 showed, indicated that adjustment
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was still taking place so estimates of social cost after 1986
must be regarded in a short term context only.
The uncertainty, that was mentioned in Chapter 2, about
the true magnitude of egg production has implications for the
analysis of the social costs of the two regimes. This stUdy
is based only on data from the controlled sector, and it is
likely that the true social costs are larger than estimated if
the controlled sector acted to set the price for backyard
production. In addition the estimates of social cost in the
absence of marketing controls are hampered by the fact that
producers are now free to market their eggs anywhere and no
data exists for this independent distribution sector.
Therefore the only directly comparable figures, in the pre and
post-deregulation environment, are the wealth transfers and
social costs per dozen because the quantities handled by egg
floors were different.
5.4.1 Estimation of the Retail Demand Curve
Quarterly data from 1980 (I) to 1985 (IV) were used to
econometrically estimate the following demand function.
*** * *** ** ***
Qd 3.43 - 0.0065 P + 0.0031 Y - 0.43D1 - 0.11D2 - 0.17D3 (5)
(3.06) (0.72) (1.70) (7.47) (1.82) (2.91)
[-0.22] [0.58]
***
where
Qd
Y
P
D1,
F (5, 17) = 15. 77
R2 = 0.82
Durbin Watson
statistic = 1.85
quarterly sales of eggs by licenced marketing agents
per head population in urban marketing areas
real disposable income index, middle quintile,
quarterly weighted moving average retail egg price,
deflated by the food price index; and
D2 and D3 are dummy variables to capture the
seasonality with 4th quarter variation in the
intercept term.
The above equation was estimated with ordinary least
squares on rho-transformed variables to remove the effects of
autocorrelation. The original specification had a Durbin
Watson ,statistic of 0.86, leading to the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient of autocorrelation was zero.
The autocorrelation coefficient, rho was estimated using the
Cochrane - Orcutt technique of gradual approximation. The
overall equation was statistically significant, even though a
key explanatory variable, own-price was not statistically
significant. The reason for this is that real prices fell
throughout the entire period (as shown by Figure 2) whilst
consumption was essentially stagnant.
The economic interpretation of this is that eggs are
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price inelastic, probably being more of a habitual purchase.
The average retail price elasticity of eggs was estimated to
be -0.22, which compares closely with figures of -0.23 for
Australia as a whole (Beck,1974) and -0.3 for the state of
Victoria (Alston, 1986). The price elasticity at farm level
was worked out using the following formula· for constant
margins:
Cfarm = Cretail (Pfarm / Pretail)
with the farm price plus 10% egg floor commission in 1984
being $1.52/dozen for grade 6 eggs and a retail price of
$1.83, giving a farm level elasticity of -0.18. The low value
for the estimated income elasticity of demand further confirms
the view of eggs as a habitual purchase, not greatly
influenced by income levels.
5.4.2 Estimation of the Supply Functions
It was not possible to econometrically estimate any of
the supply functions because the time series data on farm
price and output traces out movements in, rather than points
along the supply function. This was due to the entitlement-
cutting actions of the Poultry Board, both seasonally and
permanently. The approach used was to estimate the costs due
to production control and subtract them from the producer
price to give a point on the free supply curve. In Figure 6
this would be the distance dg, between Sl and S2, at output
Qn. The main methods of estimating the cost of production
control have been by comparing with an unregulated industry
(Veeman, 1982; Alston, 1986) or by using quota values as a
measure of the wealth transfer from consumers to producers
(Arcus, 1981)
Veeman (1982) found the second method provides very
conservative estimates of social costs due to heavy
discounting by producers for future regulatory uncertainty,
and administrative attempts to conceal quota values. Lacking
data on a similar industry and noting the problems with using
only quota values, it was decided to ~se a combination of
methods to estimate the free supply curve. The cost of
production control was partitioned into three parts: that due
to suboptimal location; that due to suboptimal size and the
annual return on quota that producers expected.
In 1984 entitlements had nil value by regulation, but
the Poultry Board had proposed a buying price of $8 per
licence in a presentation to the government. Veeman (1982)
used a 14% discount rate for estimating quota rents in Canada.
This value is much higher than the real rate of return
normally felt to be acceptable for agriculture, but is
supported by Alston (1986). He found the annual hen quota
rental rate in New South Wales to be 15.6%, of the purchase
price of quota (the only instance of entitlement rental in
N.Z. occurred in 1987 at a rate of $1.25/bird licence/year,
when selling prices were in the order of $8/licence, implying
a 16% discount rate). It appears that producers heavily
downweight future returns to quota, reflecting uncertainty
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about the future of the supply restricting program. Assuming
21.5 dozen eggs/entitlement licence/year (see Section 5.1.2) a
15% discount rate gives a quota rent of 5.6 cents per dozen
with an infinite time horizon. Reducing the time horizon to
10 years to reflect producer uncertainty gives an annual quota
rent of 7.4 cents per dozen.
Estimates of the cost of suboptimal location are
provided by the Lincoln College study commissioned by the
Board. Potential savings due to relocation with existing
facitlites were $700,000 per annum and with the building of
new facilities, $1.4 million per annum. This gives a lower
bound of 1.4 cents per dozen and an upper bound of 2.8 cents
per dozen. The cost due to inability to achieve scale
economies was estimated by using the 1979 Cost of Production
data for different sized farms, to map out the long run
average cost curve. Based on the average entitlement size in
each of the classes sampled and the cost of production that
was worked out by the survey, the following three data points
were available: 4540 birds, 85.64 cents/doz; 7650 birds,
76.16 cents/doz; and 15340 birds, 68.32 cents/doz. It was
observed that the proportionate change in price was constant,
in keeping with a smoothly declining U-shaped curve, so an
extrapolation on this basis was made out to 36510 birds, 61.3
cents/doz.
The 1979 survey gave a weigBted average cost of
production as 72.58 cents per dozen, so the cost of suboptimal
size was (72.58 - 61.3) = 11.28 cents per dozen. This was put
in 1984 terms by inflating with the rate of increase in retail
egg prices (1.66) to give a value of 18.7 cents/dozen. As a
comparison, Alston (1986) estimated the same costs in Victoria
to be between 16.5 and 20 cents per dozen, which when
converted at an exchange rate of NZ$1.28/Aust$ and deflated
back to 1984 yielded an estimate of 17.2 - 21.3 cents for an
industry of similar size, with similar controls. Putting a
range on the cost due to inefficient size of 16 to 20
cents/doz and summing the three components gave a total cost
of production control at Qn of between 23 and 30.2
cents/dozen. This does not include the factor misallocation
resulting from the use of an input quota.
It was then necessary to assume supply elasticities to
provide linear estimates of the supply functions Sl and S2.
Two values were assumed, a short run figure of 0.7 as used by
Alston (1986) and the BAE (1983) and a longer run figure of
1.5. with the short run elasticity the estimated supply
functions intercepted the horizontal axis which is
theoretically incorrect as it suggests a positive output at
zero price. Statistically estimated supply curves often have
this problem because the intercept term falls well outside the
range of data used to estimated the curve. The correct
specification would be a non-linear approach towards the
origin (Kim ~ ~., 1987) but the level of geometry would be
beyond this research. It was assumed that the pivotal shift
was from the horizontal axis, and in the longer run case, from
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the price axis. Having estimated at least one point on each
supply curve and the demand curve it was possible to estimate
free trade parameters and derive social costs.
5.4.3 Social Cost Estimates
For 1984, our representative year prior to
deregulation, supply elasticities of 0.7 and 1.5 were combined
with 'high' and 'low' estimates of the cost of production
control to give four scenarios. The' high' social cost
assumed that production control led to eggs being 30.2
cents/dozen more expensive, at the margin, than they would be
if the industry was operating on the free supply curve Sl. The
'low' value of this supply shift was 23 cents/dozen. These two
values can be considered to be the bounds for distance dg in
Figure 6.
For the post-deregulation period all social costs were
calculated under the assumption of a supply elasticity of 0.7.
The costs due to inappropriate location were assumed to be
reduced by the factor of the correlation between actual
entitlement movements and the recommendations of Beck ~ ~,
and the cost due to suboptimal size was reduced by a factor of
0.78 to reflect the increase in average entitlement holding
between 1984 and 1987. The estimates of the inefficiency loss
due to suboptimal size and location were inflated to 1987
terms with the rate of change in ,consumer prices. 'High' and
'low' estimates of social cost were based on the assumptions
used for 1984 and combined with quota rentals specific to 1987
data.
Two, of the three, estimates of annual quota rental
assumed that producers had the same discount rate as in 1984
and were based on an entitlement value of $10 per bird
licence. With a time horizon of five years a 13.9 cents/dozen
quota rental was implied, which increased to 20.4 cents/dozen
if producers reduced their time horizon· to 3 years (as
suggested in section 5.1.2). The fina,l estimate of quota
rental was set at zero to indicate what magnitude of costs and
transfers would occur in the time period immediately following
an abolition of the entitlement scheme. This requires an
assumption of no new entrants, and no internal expansion, for
the industry in the first 12 months following the removal of
quotas. It is more likely that a six month lag would be
present, given the need to raise hens from the chick stage,
and after that time there would be a movement back towards the
free supply schedule.
The post deregulation farm price (Pn in Figure 6) was
estimated from Canterbury data with regional levies to
cover the cost of overproduction being subtracted out.
Fiiures on the returns from secondary market sales were not
available for the post deregulation period, so a value of 85
cents per dozen was assumed, noting that prices to the
domestic baking trade were set to cover costs from July 1984
onwards (NZPB, 1986). Parameter values used to estimate the
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free market equilibrium (Pe, Qe) in 1984 and 1987 are listed
below.
Table 7: Parameter Values Used in the Social Cost
Estimates
Parameter 1984 1987 Explanation
Qn 51.876 m doz 43.736 m doz Receipts by licenced agents
Qd 46.987 m doz 39.446 m doz Fresh sales by " "
Pn $1.2703/doza $1.35/doza Producer payout
Ps $0. 62/dozb $0.85/doz Secondary market egg price
Ed -0.18 -0.18 Demand elasticity
Es 0.7, 1.5 0.7 Supply elasticity
a with proportion of levies for surplus disposal subtracted out.
b From IDe (1984 p24) showing loss of 96.5c/doz on surplus, and non-cost
recovery on sales to bakery trade
Equilibrium prices and quantities were estimated from the
following formulas.
QS a + bP (6)
where a Qn (l-Es)
Qd c - dP
where c Qd (I-Ed)
QS Qd
and b
and d
ts(Qn/Cn)
-Ed(Qd/Pn)
(7)
(8)
The symbols are algebraic representations of the points
on Figure 6. Social costs and changes in producers and
consumers surplus were then derived as deviations from the
estimated equilibrium values. ~
The loss of consumer surplus (CL) was calculated as:
CL = 0.5[(Pn - Pe) (Qd + Qe)] (9)
The gain in producer surplus (PG) was calculated by comparing
the producer surplus under controls (PS2) above S2 with price
Pn, with that under the free market (PSI) above S1 with price
Pe.
PG = PS2 - PSI = [0.5(Pn * Qn)] - [0.5(Pe * Qe)] (10)
The social cost due to the supply shift (SC (1» was
estimated by subtracting PS2 and the resource cost of output
Qn (measured under S1) from the industry total revenue.
SC(l) =_ (Qn * Pn) - PS2 - [0.5(Qn * Cn)] (11)
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and the social cost of oversupply (SC(2» was estimated by
subtracting surplus disposal revenue from the resource cost of
surplus output:
SC(2) = {0.5[ (Qn - Qd) (g + h)]} - CPs * (Qn - Qd)] (12)
where h was the price at which Sl equaled Qd.
The estimates of surplus transfers, and social costs
for 1984 and 1987 are presented in Table 8. It can be seen
that in 1984 price and production controls caused annual
wealth transfers from consumers to producers of between $8m
and $13m. The gain in producer surplus ranged from $18,000
to $30,000 per entitlement holder and the loss in.consumer
surplus was between 28 and 38 cents/dozen. Even at an upper
bound consumption estimate of 300 (25 dozen) eggs per year the
cost to an individual consumer would be a maximum of only
$9.50 per annum, indicating the asymetrical distribution of
costs and benefits. The social costs in the 1984 year were
between $5.9 and $9.5 million which was approximately 7% to
11% of retail sales within the licenced marketing areas.
The social cost of overproduction was much less than the
monetary loss on surplus disposal because part of the payment
for excess supply became a gain in producer surplus. The
higher social costs under an assumed supply elasticity of 1.5
were mainly due to a greater sh~ft in the supply ,curve. More
elastic supply did not provide lower competitive prices due to
the estimated point g being to the right of the equilibrium.
As a comparison, an output quota on eggs, set at Qd and using
the 'low' social cost assumption and short run elasticity
would provide only $0.4 million less producer surplus but have
a social cost of approximately half, at $3.51 million.
The 1986 removal of price and marketing controls
produced a small but unequivocal reduction in the wealth
transfer from consumers to producers and lowered the social
cost due to oversupply. This was offs~t by the increase in
social cost due to the supply shift, with the increased
optimality of size and location being counteracted by
producers expectations of higher quota rents. The net effect
was that measurable social costs declined in the aggregate,
but not on a per unit basis. The increase in SC(l) at higher
quota rentals reflected payments for entitlements to producers
who had left the industry and provides a measure of the
compensation they received. The scenario of 'zero quota rent'
indicated that there would still be substantial, although
declining, social costs in the period immediately following an
abolition of the entitlement scheme as the industry moved
towards the free supply curve. Conversely, comparing the
'zero quota rent' estimates with those for 'high' social cost
suggests that wealth transfers of between 7 and 12
cents/dozen, and a social cost of 5 cents/dozen, occur due to
producer's rent expectation. Such rent expectation is only
possible in an industry with substantial entry barriers.
=========================================================1==================================-=======~===
1984 I 1987a Change
--------------------~= 0.7------------------ For Es = 0.7
&s.= 1.5 Zero
Social Cost Social Cost Social Cost Quota cents/doz
'Hi h' 'Low" 'Hi h' 'Low' 'Hi h' 'Low' R n (1984 terms)
n ($/ doz) 0.97 1. 04 0.97 1. 04 0.88 1. 01 1.11
e ($/doz) 0.93 1. 00 0.90 0.96 0.83 0.94 1. 02
e (m doz) 49.24 48.79 49.45 , 49.06 42.17 41. 62 41.18
onsumer Lossb
($m) 16.25 12.99 17.82 14.93 13.76 10.97 8.69 ,j:::.
,j:::.
($/ doz) C 0.35 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.22 -4
roducer Gain
($m) 9.56 8.04 13.55 11. 83 8.77 7.10 5.75
($/doz) d 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.13 -6
ocial Cost
C(l) ($m) 7.92 5.97 '5.54 4.18 5.95 4.68 3.61
C(2) ($m) 1. 54 1. 90 1.37 1. 71 0.04 0.24 0.52
otal ($m) 9.46 7.87 6.91 5.89 5.99 4.92 4.03
($/doz) d 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0
==========================================================================================================
aAII1987 figures, except Cn, Pe and Qe deflated to June, 1984 level (CPI was 1.53X higher in 1987 than 1984)
bConsumers includes wholesalers and retailers cBased on domestic consumption dSased on domestic production
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Whilst there was an aggregate loss of producer surplus,
the reduction in producer numbers saw an average gain, due to
controls, of $22,000 to $27,000 per producer for the year to
June, 1987. This was within the range of the 1984 estimates
so there was no evidence to suggest that the remaining
producers were worse off than they had been. Indeed, the
theory suggested that transferrable entitlements would make
both producers who continued, and those who left, better off
than under the non-transferrable situation. The analysis was
only based upon the producer surplus on eggs marketed by the
established floors so does not include the benefits accruing
to direct marketing producers, who would also capture any of
the consumer surplus gained by the wholesale sector.
The 1987 estimates of the social cost due to oversupply
showed a significant decrease from 1984, although in both
cases the cost of oversupply was much less than the cost due
to production control. Using data for the year to September,
1987 to mirror the adjustment which was taking place, would
further lower the estimates of social cost. The movement
towards more efficient production location and size did not
bring an obvious reduction in social cost due to the greater
quota rents being obtained. However if time horizons and/or
discount rates were adjusted, to reflect greater certainty
after the 1988 industry review, the quota rent estimates would
decrease thereby lowering the social cost estimates. The
evidence at hand suggests that the deregulation was successful
in reducing the market distortions which had favoured
producers. However when compared with the competitive
equilibrium the partially deregulated environment is still
marked by a substantial wealth transfer from consumers to
producers and losses of social welfare.
5.4.4. Distribution of the Consumer Surplus
Gains
The above analysis treated all participants in the
marketing chain beyond the farm gate as "consumers" whereas
the aim of the reform was to improve the welfare of
households. The distribution of the 4 cent/dozen gain in
consumer surplus can be estimated from marketing margin data.
In 1984 the farm level price of eggs was 74% of retail and the
wholesale price 91%. Data on a national level became
unavailable after the deregulation but using Canterbury prices
for grade 6 eggs the farm level price had fallen to 69% and
the wholesale price to 89% of the retail price. The evidence
of increasing marketing margins and a greater rate of nominal
price increase suggests that the gains in consumer surplus
flowed to distributors and retailers. This may have been due
to an attempt by the retail sector to gain a markup on eggs,
similar to that of other perishables.
Some of the increase in marketing margin was brought
about by fragmentation bringing higher charges in cartoning
costs and could be viewed as an inevitable consequence of the
deregulation. However, a lack of contestability in retail and
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distribution sectors, which prevented households from gaining
the benefit of the reform, was reported by the Chairman of the
Poultry Board (Briggs, 1986). The deregulation was
coincidental with the introduction of the 1986 Commerce
Actwhich was designed to prevent an appropriation of surplus
by marketing institutions engaged in non-competitive
behaviour. The dominant position of the established
distribution agents, many of which were producer owned co-
operatives meant that in the first 18 months under
deregulation the presence of independent distributors resulted
in competitive pricing only for certain grades of eggs, in
some localities. The stated aim of the deregulation in
providing lower consumer prices was not universally achieved.
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND POLICY !MPLICATIONS
6.1 Implications of the Analysis for the Deregulation
Strategy
The empirical analysis showed that some of the
predictions of the competitive, theoretical model, which
appeared to form the basis of the policy recommendations of
both the IDe and Government departments, had not occurred
after the first 18 months of deregulation. No specification
was ever made within the model of the adjustment processes, or
the time needed for their completion, in the movement away
from industry-specific controls. If that deficiency of the
theoretical model implies instantaneous adjustment to the
lifting of controls, then the model was clearly incorrect.
The fact that different sectors and regions adjusted at
different rates indicates that account should have been taken
of the influences on the adjustment process.
The evidence relating to price discrimination,
horizontal integration and market sharing agreements suggested
that market power was being exercised by some producer and
distributor groups. This exercise of market power undoubtedly
contributed to the regional disparities in egg price movements
with consequent implications for the relocation of production.
The proprietorial linkages between producers and distributors,
under the co-operative form of organization, meant that
restrictions on free entry into the egg producing sector also
led to a lack of contestability in the distribution sector.
Thus the only source of competition amongst distributors, once
horizontal integration and market share arrangements were
negotiated, was from independent egg producers. The
entitlement scheme, by imposing a substantial barrier to new
entrants, allowed rent expectation by producers.
An associated factor in the non-achievement of the
predicted gains of reform was the lack of rigour in the
general economic regulations which replaced industry specific
controls. In the area of anti-competitive activities, the
1986 Commerce Act was meant to ensure that the efficiency
gains from deregulation were passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices 7 . However, because the Commerce
Commission had to prove, under Section 36 of the Act, that
dominant market positions were used for the purpose (rather
than had the effect) of; restricting entry, detering
7 Press Statement by Ministers of Trade and Industry, and
Agriculture and Fisheries, 10 October, 1985.
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competitive conduct, or eliminating any person from a market,
no action was brought against egg distributors exercising
market power.
The evidence on retail price determination indicated
that lower feed prices were not passed on to egg consumers and
the rate of increase in retail egg prices in the deregulated
environment was higher than in the controlled setting. This
indicates that there were no synergistic gains from the
general economic liberalisation, which included some input-
supply industries for the egg industry, that was going on in
the same time period. It appeared that the benefits of
falling real input prices were captured largely by producers,
distributors and retailers.
In support of the theoretical model underpinning the
deregulation, the evidence did seem sufficient to infer that
there was a movement towards a more efficient production
sector. This movement was both in terms of the location and
the size of production units. This structural adjustment took
place within the confines of the insulation offered by
production licencing, to incumbents and involved changes in
their numbers and time horizons. The continuation of some
excess supply indicated that overall suppply response did not
adjust as rapidly as a simple model would predict.
The most substantive implication of the research is that
the policy of incremental deregulation has enabled some groups
to achieve substantial benefits whilst losses are still widely
diffused amongst COnSumers. The marketing arrangements
currently in place indicate that competition does not
automatically result from a removal of economic regulation.
In planning the deregulation, greater emphasis should have
been placed on the role of market ing inst i tut ions. A
deregulation, by altering the distribution of government
sanctioned rents, essentially attempts to reassign, or
redefine property rights. This study has shown that costs of
adjustment and vested interests imply that such changes are
unlikely to be smoothly achieved.
The implications of these findings for other recently
deregulated agricultural industries depends upon the ability
of producers, in those industries, to influence prices. As
Sandrey (1988) notes, agricultural commodities are generally
characterised by inelastic demand indicating potential
producer benefits from exploitation of market power in the
form of price-making. In the presence of entry barriers the
scope exists for legislative pricing to be replaced with
producer determined, rather than market determined, pricing
with the result that the wealth tranfers from consumers are
not reduced after the removal of regulation.
6.2 Areas For Further Research
The reduction in the statutory powers of the Poultry
Board means that analysis of the deregulated industry was
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hampered by a scarcity of data observations. Moreover, the
absence of. controls led to greater inter-temporal and inter-
regional price variability so average values, or data derived
from only one region, is less robust than it once was. The
egg industry warrants continued observation to ascertain
whether the findings of this research are based on incomplete
adjustment to the 1986 reform. Until then, no firm
conclusions on the usefulness of the theoretical deregulation
model can be made.
An alternative approach to the estimation of the free
supply function would be useful in testing the estimates of
social costs and wealth transfers. The most promising
approach would be to build up a synthetic supply function from
firm-level data. Confirmation of the elasticity of the
unrestrained supply function would be useful in predicting the
effect on prices of a removal of production control. Many of
the submissions to the I.D.C. review claimed that the removal
of controls would lead to a situation of cyclical price
variability (IDC, 1985). This is a testable hypothesis, which
could be subjected to a 'cobweb' model analysis based on
empirical elasticity estimates.
A further area of necessary research concerns the
response of producers to supported and free prices. Hallam
(1978) analysed the removal of British egg price supports in
1971 by testing the relationship between chick placements and
input and output prices and concluded that response was
greater in a supported market because there was less risk.
The New Zealand experience suggests that supported prices can
hinder adjustment by maintaining some producers who would
otherwise be uneconomic. A test of Hallam's model with the
New Zealand data would be a useful exercise.
6.3 Conclusions
The deregulation of the New Zealand egg industry in 1986
was part of a general economic liberalisation strategy. The
specific aims were to lower consumer cos~s and introduce more
competition into the industry, in the expectation that greater
economic efficiency would result. The deregulation was
partial in nature, affecting only marketing and price
controls. The government rationale for maintaining production
control was to prevent surplus production and provide a
compensation mechanism for producers leaving the industry.
The prices paid for entitlements indicated a rapid
adjustment of producer's time horizons to the forthcoming 1988
industry review. Producers who left the industry were
compensated by selling entitlements. Even though the
aggregate wealth transfer to producers declined, individuals
who remained were not worse off than they had been because the
aggregate stream of rents gained by production control was
shared amongst fewer of them. The major influence on regional
production movements was the relative magnitude of excess
capacity. The market power of some distributors was used to
protect producer incomes,
direction of entitlement
significant transactions
entitlement movements.
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and had an influence on the
movements. The presence of
costs limited inter-regional
Deregulation changed the nature of egg price
determination. The benefits of lower input costs, in part
relating to the general economic liberalisation, were not
carried through into retail egg prices. There was still a
significant, but declining, excess supply of eggs after the
first 18 months of deregulation, indicating that adjustment
was not complete. There was some evidence of price
discrimination and market sharing agreements. There was a
small reduction in the aggregate transfer of wealth to
producers, with the surplus being gained by distributors,
retailers and, in areas with competitive distribution systems,
consumers. The social cost of the remaining regulations was
similar to the previous situation. The lack of reduction in
social cost appeared to be due to the partial nature of the
deregulation as producers expected a higher return on quota
than previously, resulting from their shortened time planning
horizon. The continuation of the entitlement scheme may have
helped in the reduction of the surplus but it also acted as a
insulative barrier which made producer rent expectation
possible.
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REVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT
TERMS
APPENDIX A
SCHEME FOR THE EGG
OF REFERENCE
INDUSTRY:
In 1985, the Government announced the removal of a number of
controls specific to the egg industry. These included the
removal of any limits on the number of "entitlements"held by
individual producers, and also the lifting of restrictions on
the transfer of "entitlements" between producers. An
entitlement is a quantitative restriction on the number of
birds a producer may farm. At the same time, the Government
announced that the system of controlling production through
the entitlement system should be reviewed in 1988. Since then
the Government has also announced a comprehensive review of a
large number of statutory bodies, including the New Zealand
Poultry Board.
In accordance with the Government's wishes, the Department of
Trade and Industry invites submissions from any interested
party on:
(a) the effects of the deregulation from 1 April 1986, of
the egg industry, on the supply, price and quality of
eggs available to the publid.
(b) the mechanisms and economic effects of the current
entitlement scheme as a means of operating statutory
production controls.
(c) the need for the continuation of statutory controls on
the production of eggs in the national interest.
(d) the need for, and appropriate composition of a statutory
body for the egg industry, in the presence/absence of
statutory production controls.
Persons or organisations wishing to make submissions may do so
in writing, no later than Friday 29 April, addressed to:
Egg Industry Entitlement Review
Department of Trade and Industry
(BC2B)
POBox 1473
WELLINGTON
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APPENDIX B
BUdget For a 20,000 Bird Farm in Canterbury Constrained by Entitlement Cuts
Assumptions
Brooding 0 - 6 weeks; Rearing 7 - 18 weeks; Laying cycle 51 weeks
Rearing mortality 2.4%; Laying Mortality 11.72%
Feed consumption/bird: Brooding 39.2 g/day; Rearing 101 g/day; laying 123 g/day
Management: Birds carried over '12 month lay perior:' with mixed age birds in the same shed;
Bird numbers: Operation built new in 1978 with 20,000 bird capacitY (owner holding same number of entitlements)
Across-the-board 10% entitlement cut on 1/6/83 and 7% cut on 31.3/86 reduced base entitlement level to 16740
VIS and CCO production cuts limit operative entitlements to an average of 15010 from 1/4/86 to 31/3/87
and 14826 from 1/4/87 assuming the proposed CCO 4% cut planned for 1/1/88 is not implemented
Farm gate price is based on transport cost for Rangiora location
Base Information 1986/87 1987/88
Egg Production/hen housed/yr 265 265
Farm Gate Price ($/dozen) $1.44 $1.46
Interest rate (decimal) 0.2 0.2
Operative entitlements 15010 14826
Entitlement utilisation" 0.952 0.963
Labour cost ($/hour) $7.50 $7.69
Chick placements 15360 15360
Average bird number 14290 14277
ITEM
========================
Revenue
Eggs (dozen)
Cull hens
Total Revenue
VARIABLE COSTS··
UNIT PRICE
$0.60
QUANTITY
359900
13051
1986/87 $
$518256
$7831
$526087
============
QUANTITY
============
361152
12988
============
1987/88 $
============
$527281'
$7793 ,
$535074
Rearing Expenses
Oay Old Chicks $1.75 15360 $26880
Chick Vaccine $0.07 15360 $1075
Poultry Board Chick Levy $0.30 15360 $4608
Starter feed @1.65 kg/bird $0.36 25344 $9200
Grower feed @ 6.35 kg/bird $0.30 97536 $28773
General labour $7.50 768 $5760
Oebeaking labour $7.50 64 $480
Medication $0.20 15360 $3072
Cleaning/disinfection $0.03 15360 $461
Electricity & fuel $0.08 15360 $1229
Total Rearing Expenses $81538
15360
15360
15360
25344
97536
768
64
15360
15360
15360
$27552
$1102
$4608
$9430
$29492
$5904
$492
$3149
$472
$1260
$83461
Laying Costs
Feed @ 44.77 kg/bird
Labour @320 hours/1000 birds
Poultry Board & CCO Levies
Medicationtvet. costs
Cleaning/disinfection
Electricity
Repairs etc @ 1% laying costs
Total Laying Expenses
$0.31
$7.50
$0.13
$0.03
$0.57
639742
4573
$3.82
14290
14290
14290
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$199599
$34295
$54586
$1858
$429
$8145
$2989
$301901
639201
4569
$2.93
14277
14277
14277
$204416
$36001
$41833
$1902
$439
$8342
$2929
$295862
Working Capital
Interest on chick rearing cost'
Intere::t on laying costs····
Total Working Capital Cost
Total Variable Cost
Returns Above Variable Costs
0.2
0.2
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$40769
$30190
$8154
$6038
$14192
$397631
$128456
$41731
$29586
$8346
$5911
$14253
$393587
$141487
====~~=~=======================================================:
FIXED COSTS
==================~=====
Adminic;tration @ 1 % Variable cost
Utility @ 120 km/week
Car @ 60krnlweek
Tracto' @ 4 hours/month
Insurance @2% capital value
Depredation
BuildinGs @ 5%
Plant (;, 10%
Dwelli;;g @ 15% to business
Car @ 25% to business
Total Depreciation
$1.00
$0.60
$25.00
0.002
0.05
0.10
0.05
0.10
397631
6240
3120
48
947123
491363
205760
16500
5000
$3976
$6240
$1872
$1200
$1894
$24568
$20576
$825
$500
$46469
393587
6240
3120
48
947123
491363
205760
16500
5000
$4034
$6396
$1919
$1230
$1942
$24568
$20576
$825
$500
$46469
Rates
Int~tost Charges'"''
Total Fixed Costs
PROFIT/LOSS
Fixed Asset Schedule
(@0.5% land and buildings)
(see attached sChedule)
(Replacement Value)
$3057
$62405
$127114 I
-------------- I
$1343 I
$3179
$59490
$124659
$16828
=============
;~=~=~========~===== ============ ============ =============== =========================
.-~=~================ ============ ============ ===============
Units Quantity Unit Cost Total Value
==================~======
Layer sheds (4) sq metres 582.9 $160
Cage!:", feeders, drinkers
AncillLy plant
$373056
$138240
$17920
Broo();ng Shed sq metres
Autom:::tic feeders, drinkers and other plant
150 $192
$529216
$28800
$2600
Grow;;ig Shed
Cage~;, feeders, drinkers, other plant
sq metres 465.67 $160
$31400
$74507
$28000
Other BUildings
land
Plant & Vehicles
Utility
Misc. Tools
Dwelling, Garage & Car
Total Investment
(Egg shed, Cool store, workshop)
hectares 6 $20000
$102507
$15000·
$120000
$14000
$5000
$130000
$947123
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FOOTNOTES
The higher utilisation of entitlement in 1987/88 is due to there being only two operative entitlement levels for
the year compared with three in 1986/87, making flock management easier
All costs except levies and fixed capital charges are assumed to be 2.5% higher in 1987/88,
reflecting the rise in the Pig, Poultry and Other Farm Input price index between September quarters
... Interest on chick rearing costs is assumed to cover 50% of costs as older birds will be producing income
•••• Interest on laying costs is assumed to cover only 10% of total laying costs due to the fact that fortnightly
payouts mean that most laying expenses can be met from cash income.
••••• Interest payments on fixed capital are based on the following assumptions:
From August 1978 to Dec 1986 the Farm Buildings component of the "Capital Expenditure Index" increased 2.5X
On this basis the value of land and buildings when the unit was established would be $380,000
It was assumed that $350,000 of this was debt financed, initially at 10% with a 20 year payback.
This, and rising interest rates gave the following repayment schedule
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Repayment Schedule for 1978 Loan of $350,000
Interest Rate Annual Payment Interest Component J..RLSleJ.lmJ.l<all!.;n.w;n'l.lall-L-pl.llrjowa<!l·Pw;aill.' _
0.1 41125 35000 343875
0.1 41125 34388 337138
0.11 43775 37085 330448
0.12 46414 39654 323688
0.13 49015 42079 316752
0.14 51570 44345 309527
0.15 54071 46429 301885
0.17 58982 51320 294223
0.19 62405 55902 287720
0.17 59490 48912 277142
======================== ============ ============ =============

APPENDIX C
DATA SOURCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS
Section 5.1.1 Producer Numbers
Number of entitlerrent holders: NZPB Annual Report, Table 1 (various years)
Nominal Producer Payout Price: NZPB Annual Report, Table 12 (various years)
Nominal Producer Price Index: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 21.19
Consumers Price Index: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 21.01
Section 5.2 Entiltement Movements
Recorrmendations of Beck (et al, 1984), Table 1, "Relocation Priorities"
NZPB (1984)
Transforrna.tion: Multiplied by 12,000 to put in terms of individual eggs
Divided by 245 to put in terms of entitlements
Actual Changes from NZPB Newsletter, 8 April, 1987
Aggregation: The two sources noted above used different regional definit-
ions necessitating the use of the following aggregations:
Whakatane Tauranga and Rotorua from NZPB combined
,
Central Otago and Dunedin/South Otago from NZPB combined
CHR and ASH (Christchurch and Ashburton) from Beck et al.
combined.
Section 5.2.1 Explanatory Model
Regional Changes in Entitlement Holdings (Y) as for 'Actual Changes' above.
Regional Population Growth Rate, New Zealand Yearbook (1982 and 1986)
Excess Capacity on Farms, Tables 2 - 6, NZPB Annual Reprt (1979 to 1986)
Section 5.3.1 Retail Price
Nominal Egg Price Index: INFOS, Departrrent of Statistics, Series CPIM.SE923A
Ncrninal Producer Price Index: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 21.18
Consumers Price Index: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 21.01
Section 5.4.1 Estimation of the Retail Demand Curve
Quarterly Sales of Eggs: NZPB Annual, Report, Table 1J- trans_forrred by
dividing by the weighted average of the NZ population in urban
areas with marketing agents (NZ Official Yearbook).
Real Disposable Income Index: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 22.06
Nominal Egg Prices: D2partITent ~f Statistics, Series CPIM.SE923A, deflated
by Food Price Index, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Table 21.03
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